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“A trademark works as a symbolic handshake.”1  It assures the 
superiority of the mark to anyone, anywhere looking to make a 
purchase.2  Before the age of railroads, interstate commerce, and 
industrialization, most goods were produced and sold locally.3  
There was no pressing need to distinguish one store from another, 
because everyone in town looking to buy Brittany’s Breads knew 
                                                                                                             
1 Laura A. Heymann, The Law of Reputation and the Interest of the Audience, 52 B.C. 
L. REV. 1341, 1385 (2011). 
2 See id. 
3 See Robert G. Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A History of the Concept of Goodwill in 
Trademark Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 547, 575–76 (2006). 
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exactly who Brittany was.4  This symbolic handshake was far from 
being merely symbolic.5  Goodwill was formed on the basis of a 
person’s reputation as perhaps a meticulous dressmaker or as 
someone who provided quality service.6  The handshake between 
the seller and the patron guaranteed the service.7  But then, the 
population grew and urbanized.8  Transcontinental railroads 
opened, permitting goods to ship to consumers nationwide.9  As a 
result, the handshake that once guaranteed quality needed to be 
expressed in a different, symbolic way, and with that came the 
expansion of trademark law.10 
One way to establish a mark’s identity for today’s broader 
consumer base is through trademark branding.  Modern marketing 
science has found parallels between branding and its effects on 
memory and the legal concept of acquired distinctiveness.11  A 
positive brand experience is embodied in a good memory, with 
“[t]he strongest brands in the world own[ing] a place in the 
consumer’s mind.”12  It takes a mere fifty milliseconds—one 
twentieth of a second—for consumers to create their opinions 
about websites.13  Given that a consumer’s perception of an entire 
website is formed that quickly, it is inconceivable that it would 
take much longer for a person to form a response to a mark used in 
product placement. 
This Note will argue that unsponsored product placement 
dilutes a trademark by blurring its identity with that of the media in 
which it was placed.14  Finding trademark incorporation in product 
placement to be a commercial use of a mark under the Lanham 
                                                                                                             
4 See id. 
5 See id. at 575. 
6 See id. 
7 See Heymann, supra note 1, at 1385. 
8 See Bone, supra note 3, at 576. 
9 See id. 
10 See id. at 578–79 (noting that prior to 1870, there were a total of 62 trademarks in 
the US, a stark contrast from the 100 filed annually between 1907 and 1909). 
11 See Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law and Cognitive 
Science, 86 TEX. L. REV. 507, 512–13 (2008). 
12 Id. at 516 (quoting SCOTT M. DAVIS, BRAND ASSET MANAGEMENT: DRIVING 
PROFITABLE GROWTH THROUGH YOUR BRANDS 3 (2000)). 
13 See id. at 508. 
14 See infra Part III. 
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Act, will allow brands to retain ultimate control over how their 
marks are perceived.  This will accordingly diminish the risk of 
trademark dilution.  Part I of this Note will look at trademarks, 
how they are diluted, and the occasions where unauthorized use is 
exempted from causing dilution.15  Part II will analyze the 
conflicting degree of protection trademarks are granted in 
unauthorized product placement.16  Finally, Part III will argue that 
trademarks should be viewed as a commercial use when 
incorporated into media and, to prevent the risk of dilution, their 
use in product placement should only be permitted with the 
markholder’s authorization.17 
I. TRADEMARK LAW AND THE NEED TO PROTECT A BRAND’S 
REPUTATION 
To identify a brand to consumers and differentiate it from its 
competitors, companies apply trademarks to their products and 
services.18  To be successful these marks must be distinctive.19  
Trademarks that become generic lose their protection, as they can 
no longer distinguish a brand.20  Similarly, dilution is defined to be 
the use of a mark which “impairs the distinctiveness” of the 
mark.21  There are only limited occasions during which a mark 
may be used without the markholder’s permission.22  This 
introduces confusion into the characterization of product 
placement, and begets the question whether a reasonably prudent 
consumer can sufficiently differentiate a trademark from its use in 
product placement to prevent dilution. 
                                                                                                             
15 See infra Part I. 
16 See infra Part II. 
17 See infra Part III. 
18 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic 
Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 274 (1987). 
19 See id. at 273. 
20 See Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt, Rethinking the Parameters of Trademark Use in 
Entertainment, 61 FLA. L. REV. 1011, 1023 (2009). 
21 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A) (2012). 
22 See id. at § 1125(c)(3). 
2014] QUIET ON SET! 589 
 
A. What is a Trademark? 
A trademark provides a shorthand by which consumers may 
recognize the maker of a good or service, that maker’s reputation, 
and the quality of everything associated with the maker’s 
trademark.23  It permits a “company to ‘brand’ itself and 
distinguish its goods and services from those of its competitors.”24  
Once a mark has branded itself and attained consumer approbation, 
trademark owners must make sure they continue investing in the 
quality of their services and products so that consumers remain 
loyal.25  To help in this endeavor, trademarks are granted federal 
protection under the Lanham Act by holding civilly liable: 
[a]ny person who . . . uses in commerce any word, 
term, name, symbol, or device . . . which—(A) is 
likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to 
deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or 
association of such person with another person, or 
as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or 
her goods, services, or commercial activities by 
another person . . .26 
The Lanham Act protects uses of a mark in commerce.27  As 
used in the statute, the word commerce references all commerce 
that Congress may legally regulate under the Commerce Clause.28  
In United States v. Lopez, the Supreme Court outlined three 
occasions when Congress may act under its Commerce Clause 
powers—it can regulate (1) channels of commerce, (2) instruments 
of commerce or things and people in commerce, and (3) economic 
activity that has a substantial effect on commerce.29  In line with 
this definition, the commercial use of a trademark is found when: 
                                                                                                             
23 See Landes & Posner, supra note 18, at 269; see also Top Tobacco, L.P. v. N. Atl. 
Operating Co., 509 F.3d 380, 381 (7th Cir. 2007). 
24 Lesli Harris, The New Old Spice: Business Identities, Trademarks, and Social 
Media, 31 MISS. C. L. REV. 309, 310 (2012). 
25 See Landes & Posner, supra note 18, at 270. 
26 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2012).  The Lanham Act also provides for federal 
registration of a trademark. See Harris, supra note 24, at 310. 
27 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A). 
28 See id. § 1127. 
29 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995). 
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(A) it is placed in any manner on the goods or their 
containers or the displays associated therewith or on 
the tags or labels affixed thereto, or if the nature of 
the goods makes such placement impracticable, 
then on documents associated with the goods or 
their sale, and (B) the goods are sold or transported 
in commerce . . .30 
It is also a use in commerce if the mark is placed “on services 
when it is used or displayed in the sale or advertising of 
services . . . .”31 
The Internet is considered an instrument of commerce that 
Congress can regulate.32  The Eleventh Circuit further found that 
the Internet’s global nature and extensive reach permits it to 
function as an instrument of commerce even where there are no 
actual sales.33  Therefore, the mere act of creating an online home 
page that provides access to all users has been found to meet the 
Lanham Act’s “in commerce” requirement.34  The two marks must 
simply be the same or practically the same, meaning alike enough 
that a sufficiently large portion of target consumers believe the 
derivative mark is identical to the protected mark.35  For example, 
the expansive use of a mark on the Internet that was similar to 
Cable News Network’s CNN mark was found to impinge upon 
CNN’s ability to differentiate itself from its competitors in Cable 
News Network, L.P., L.L.L.P. v. CNNews.com.36  Accordingly, the 
                                                                                                             
30 15 U.S.C. § 1127. 
31 Id. 
32 See United States v. Trotter, 478 F.3d 919, 921 (8th Cir. 2007); United States v. 
MacEwan, 445 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2006); United States v. Hornaday, 392 F.3d 1306, 
1311 (11th Cir. 2004). 
33 See Planetary Motion, Inc. v. Techsplosion, Inc., 261 F.3d 1188, 1194–96 (11th Cir. 
2001).  For a similar holding in the Fourth Circuit, see Cable News Network, L.P. v. 
CNNews.com, 177 F. Supp. 2d 506, 517–18 (E.D. Va. 2001), aff’d in part, vacated in 
part sub nom, 56 F. App’x 599 (4th Cir. 2003) (finding that the offering of news and 
information on the Internet could be characterized as the use of a trademark in commerce 
under the Commerce Clause). 
34 See Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am., Inc. v. Bucci, No. 97 Civ. 0629 (KMW), 
1997 WL 133313, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 1997), aff’d, 152 F.3d 920 (2d Cir. 1998). 
35 See Jada Toys, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 518 F.3d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Thane 
Int’l, Inc. v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 305 F.3d 894, 905 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
36 177 F. Supp. 2d at 519. 
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Fourth Circuit held the cnnews.com website, which served as a 
source of news and information to Chinese-speaking people around 
the world but neither sold nor offered to sell goods outside of 
China, to be a use in commerce that created a possibility of 
economic harm to the CNN mark.37  Similarly, in Visa 
International Service Association v. JSL Corp., the District of 
Nevada found the use of the EVISA mark for an online homepage 
and domain name to be a use in commerce that was likely to dilute 
the well-known VISA mark.38  The possibility of dilution is just 
one of the harms from which the Lanham Acts attempts to shield a 
trademark.39 
B. Threats to a Trademark’s Strength  
A trademark’s reputation can be “gamed, possessed, and lost; it 
is valuable or priceless; [and] it can be borrowed or lent.”40  
Though a markholder has control over the product it produces and 
introduces to the public, it is the consumers who are ultimately 
responsible for determining how the product is assessed and for 
dictating its reputation.41  Accordingly, as the value of a trademark 
can fluctuate, it must avoid any “distracting and inappropriate 
associations” which could threaten genericide or dilution.42 
                                                                                                             
37 See id. at 521.  Although under the 1995 Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA), 
the Fourth Circuit required proof of more than the possibility of harm, actual harm is no 
longer required. See Deborah R. Gerhardt, The 2006 Trademark Dilution Revision Act 
Rolls out a Luxury Claim and a Parody Exemption, 8 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 213, 217 
(2007). 
38 See Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n v. JSL Corp., 590 F. Supp. 2d 1306, 1313, 1316, 1320–21 
(D. Nev. 2008), aff’d, 610 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting that the dilution standard has 
changed to likelihood of dilution and then finding dilution because use of EVISA on the 
Internet as a homepage and domain name was a use in commerce that was likely to cause 
dilution). 
39 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2012). 
40 Heymann, supra note 1, at 1366. 
41 See id. at 1342. 
42 See Landes & Posner, supra note 18, at 307; see also Corina I. Cacovean, Is Free 
Riding Aided by Parody to Sneak Between the Cracks of the Trademark Dilution Revision 
Act?, 31 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 441, 453–54 (2009) (noting Posner’s explanation 
that dilution could result when a junior user free rides on a famous trademark’s goodwill 
and risks turning it generic). 
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1. Genericide 
Markholders must police their marks and prevent them from 
being reduced to generic words, or the traditional adjectives used 
to describe products.43  Generic terms may not be registered and 
protected under the Lanham Act.44  In deciding whether a word is 
generic, courts look to dictionary definitions of the word, how 
competitors use the word, how the alleged markholder uses the 
word, how media uses the term, national testimony from people in 
that industry, and consumer surveys pertaining to the word.45  
Therefore, a mark that is, for example, used such that it becomes a 
household name with no substitute means of connoting the 
product, has become generic and is no longer protected under the 
Lanham Act.46  Pilates, for example, became generic after it was 
mentioned repeatedly on local and national news and entertainment 
programs as a form of exercise rather than as the source of services 
or equipment.47  Similarly, the mark MURPHY BED became 
generic for a bed that folds into a wall in part because of 
newspapers’ and magazines’ use of the term as a description for 
this particular kind of bed.48  Another way a markholder risks 
losing protection is if its mark is diluted. 
                                                                                                             
43 See, e.g., Freecycle Network, Inc. v. Oey, 505 F.3d 898, 905 (9th Cir. 2007); 
Premier Nutrition, Inc. v. Organic Food Bar, Inc., No. SACV 06-0827 AG (RNBx), 2008 
WL 1913163, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2008). 
44 See Landes & Posner, supra note 18, at 291. 
45 See, e.g., Henry Heide, Inc. v. George Ziegler Co., 354 F.2d 574, 576 (7th Cir. 
1965) (finding the term “jujubes” generic, in part, due to extensive use of the term by 
manufacturers in consumer advertising); Colt Def. L.L.C. v. Bushmaster Firearms, Inc., 
No. Civ.04–240–P–S, 2005 WL 2293909, at *22 (D. Me. Sept. 20, 2005); Gaylord 
Entm’t Co. v. Gilmore Entm’t Grp., 187 F. Supp. 2d 926, 937 (M.D. Tenn. 2001) (citing 
Nat’l Baseball Hall of Fame v. All Sports Promotion Grp., Inc., No. 99-CIV-3635 
(KMW), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1592, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2001)). 
46 See Henry Heide, Inc. v. George Ziegler Co., 354 F.2d 574, 576 (7th Cir. 1965) 
(finding the term “jujubes” generic, in part, due to extensive use of the term by 
manufacturers in consumer advertising); Colt Def. L.L.C. v. Bushmaster Firearms, Inc., 
No. Civ.04–240–P–S, 2005 WL 2293909, at *22 (D. Me. Sept. 20, 2005). 
47 See Pilates, Inc. v. Current Concepts, Inc., 120 F. Supp. 2d 286, 302 (S.D.N.Y. 
2000). 
48 See Murphy Door Bed Co. v. Interior Sleep Sys., Inc., 874 F.2d 95, 101 (2d Cir. 
1989). 
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2. Dilution 
For Judge Posner, a successful brand hinges on a consumer’s 
ability to instantly identify a product and accordingly, “know[] 
whom to hold responsible if the brand disappoints and whose 
product to buy in the future if the brand pleases.”49  Trademark 
dilution is founded on the policy that the distinguishing nature of a 
mark should be preserved.50  The Trademark Dilution Revision Act 
of 2006 (TDRA) states that trademark dilution occurs when an 
individual adopts an owner’s original mark in commerce, once that 
senior mark has become famous and acquired distinctiveness.51  
The first person to use a mark within the United States is the senior 
user, and the later person to adopt the mark, here the person with 
the diluting mark, is the junior user.52 
Prior to the TDRA, under the 1995 Federal Trademark Dilution 
Act (FTDA), Mosley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc. read dilution to 
require a finding of actual harm, rather than simply a “likelihood” 
of harm.53  Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, held that the 
mere “mental association” between Victor’s Secret, a lingerie store 
in Kentucky, and Victoria’s Secret would, “not necessarily reduce 
the capacity of the famous mark to identify the goods of its owner, 
the statutory requirement for dilution under the FTDA.”54  The 
TDRA was thus enacted in response to the Mosley holding, with 
the intent of broadening the Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
dilution law so that it better protected senior marks.55 
The TDRA only requires injured parties to show that the 
infringing party “commences use of a mark or trade name in 
commerce that is likely to cause dilution.”56  The 2006 revision 
                                                                                                             
49 Ty, Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 510 (7th Cir. 2002). 
50 See Cacovean, supra note 42, at 444. 
51 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2012). 
52 See 5 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 26:5 (4th ed. 2012). 
53 Mosley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 433 (2003). 
54 Id. 
55 See Katya Assaf, The Dilution of Culture and the Law of Trademarks, 49 IDEA 1, 
43 (2008) (explaining that many scholars believe this revision increased the scope of 
trademark protection). 
56 15 U.S.C § 1125(c)(1) (2012) (emphasis added). 
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also requires the original mark to be famous.57  Posner explains 
that only after this point, where a trademark has become successful 
and easily identifiable to consumers, must a markholder worry 
about dilution.58  Dilution can occur if the famous mark is subject 
to blurring or tarnishment.59 
3. Blurring 
Frank Schechter was the first person to describe what is now 
known as dilution by blurring.60  In 1927, he explained that if 
trademarks are allowed to be “used on different classes of 
goods, . . . there is not a single one of these fanciful marks, which 
will not, if used on different classes of goods, or to advertise 
different services, gradually but surely lose its effectiveness and 
unique distinctiveness . . .”61  When the TDRA was passed in 
2006, it adhered closely to this definition.62  There are several 
factors the statute lays out for courts to consider when determining 
whether there has been dilution by blurring: (1) the similarity 
between the two marks, (2) the inherent or acquired distinctiveness 
of the famous mark, (3) the owner of the famous mark’s use is 
“substantially exclusive,” (4) the familiarity consumers have with 
the famous mark, (5) the mark or trade name’s purposeful 
association with the famous mark, and (6) the actual association 
existing between the two marks.63 
Although the likelihood of dilution requirement has lowered 
the bar to establish dilution, the holder of an original mark must 
                                                                                                             
57 See id. 
58 See Ty, Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 511 (7th Cir. 2002). 
59 See 15 U.S.C § 1125(c)(1). 
60 See Mark P. McKenna, A Consumer Decision-Making Theory of Trademark Law, 98 
VA. L. REV. 67, 106 (2012). 
61 Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 
813, 829–30 (1927). 
62 See 15 U.S.C § 1125(c)(2)(B) (“‘[D]ilution by blurring’ is association arising from 
the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that impairs the 
distinctiveness of the famous mark.”).  It should also be noted that the TDRA’s standard 
of likelihood of confusion differs from Schechter’s standard of actual confusion. 
Compare Schechter, supra note 61, at 825 (noting that the law only protects infringement 
if it injures a producer’s trade reputation or financial health), with 15 U.S.C § 1125(c)(1) 
(requiring that a mark be “likely to cause dilution . . . regardless of the presence or 
absence of actual or likely confusion, of competition, or of actual economic injury”). 
63 See 15 U.S.C § 1125(c)(2)(B). 
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still show more than mere mental association between the two 
marks.64  The statute has evolved over the years as can be 
evidenced through the case Starbucks v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee.65  
This case has been appealed and remanded a total of five times, 
and each successive opinion has demonstrated a more nuanced 
understanding of the TDRA.66  Starbucks alleged but failed to 
prove that Wolfe’s Mr. Charbucks brand coffee was infringing 
upon and diluting the Starbucks mark by blurring.67  In 2008, the 
Southern District of New York held that the marks needed to be 
substantially similar to establish blurring.68  The Second Circuit, 
however, disagreed, explaining that the TDRA does not use words 
such as “very” and “substantial” in conjunction with “similarity.”69  
Moreover, the court explained that were the statute to compel a 
finding of substantial similarity, the application of the remaining 
five factors would necessarily be contingent on that finding.70  
Since a statute should be read to give meaning to every word,71 the 
court held that the TDRA did not require substantial similarity.72  
In November of 2013, the Second Circuit revisited the Charbucks 
label.73  It accepted the district court’s findings that the Starbucks 
and Charbucks marks were only minimally similar due to 
Charbucks’s Black Bear packaging and the words Mister or Blend 
                                                                                                             
64 See Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 559 F. Supp. 2d 472, 476 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
65 Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 5981 (LTS) (THK), 
2005 WL 3527126 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2005), vacated, 477 F.3d 765 (2d Cir. 2007), 
remanded to 559 F. Supp. 2d 472 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 588 
F.3d 97 (2d Cir. 2009).  It was first heard in 2005 under the FTDA. See Starbucks, 559 F. 
Supp. 2d at 474. 
66 Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 736 F.3d 198, 202–05 (2d Cir. 
2013) (reviewing the case’s procedural history—this case was appealed to the Second 
Circuit in 2007, which held that the TDRA should apply, and was subsequently remanded 
to the Southern District of New York in 2008, appealed to the Second Circuit in 2009, 
remanded again to the Southern District in 2011, and is now on appeal at the Second 
Circuit). 
67 Starbucks, 2005 WL 3527126, at * 9. 
68 Starbucks, 588 F.3d at 107. 
69 Id. at 108. 
70 Id. 
71 See, e.g., Setser v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1463, 1470 (2012) (quoting United 
States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538–539 (1955)). 
72 Starbucks, 588 F.3d at 109. 
73 Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 736 F.3d 198, 201 (2d Cir. 2013). 
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which always accompany the Charbucks mark when it is used in 
commerce.74  Upon balancing the six non-exclusive factors laid out 
in the TDRA, the Second Circuit affirmed its previous holding that 
the Charbucks mark was only nominally similar and therefore not 
exemplary of dilution by blurring.75 
The TDRA does not require the two companies to be in direct 
competition, as they were in Starbucks, to establish dilution by 
blurring.76  Nor does it matter whether the junior mark was used to 
identify the company’s own goods, services, or business as falsely 
being the product of the senior mark holder.77  Dilution by blurring 
must simply establish that the unauthorized use is “whittling away” 
at the senior, famous mark’s selling power.78 
4. Tarnishment 
The other statutory form of dilution is tarnishment, which 
occurs when there is “association arising from the similarity 
between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that harms the 
reputation of the famous mark.”79  One particular association for 
which case law generally finds tarnishment is where a junior mark 
associates itself with a famous mark to sell sex-related products.80  
The complaint Ben & Jerry’s recently filed against Rodax 
distributors might exemplify this standard for finding 
tarnishment.81  Rodax created pornographic movies with titles such 
as Ben & Cherry’s and Boston Cream Thigh, seeming paradigms 
for tarnishment.82 
                                                                                                             
74 Id. at 208. 
75 Id. at 213. 
76 See Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Hyundai Motor Am., No. 10 CIV.1611 PKC, 
2012 WL 1022247, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2012). 
77 See id. (explaining that blurring claims are not contingent upon a false designation 
of origin claim). 
78 See id. at *6. 
79 15 U.S.C § 1125(c)(2)(C) (2012). 
80 See V Secret Catalogue Inc., v. Mosley, 605 F.3d 382, 388 (6th Cir. 2010). 
81 See Ben & Jerry’s Homemade, Inc. v. Rodax Distribs, Inc., 12 CIV. 6734, 2012 WL 
3888233, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2012). 
82 See id.  Other titles include Everything But the Butt, Hairy Garcia, Late Night 
Snatch, Americone Cream, New York Super Fat & Chunky, Chocolate Fudge Bars, 
Coconut 7 Lay-Her Bar, and Peanut Butter D-Cups, and Banana Clit. 
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Though tarnishment of a trademark is prohibited, there are 
certain exceptions to the TDRA where the unauthorized use of a 
trademark is not found to cause dilution. 
C. Exceptions to Trademark Infringement 
First Amendment concerns in trademark dilution law have 
resulted in exceptions for fair use, which includes comment, 
criticism and comparative advertising, and parody.83  Two other 
exceptions to dilution under the TDRA are news reporting and 
commentary and any noncommercial use of a mark.84  This Note 
will primarily consider the parody exception and its interplay with 
noncommercial use. 
1. The Fair Use Defense of Parody 
The TDRA exempts “nominative or descriptive fair use, or 
facilitation of such fair use, of a famous mark by another person 
other than as a designation of source for the person’s own goods or 
services” from being causes of action in dilution.85  Under the 
nominative fair use doctrine, a trademark may be used where it is 
(1) impractical to identify the product or service without the use of 
the trademark, (2) limited to what is absolutely necessary to 
identify the good or service, and (3) does not imply that the 
markholder is responsible for, or has supported or paid for the 
use.86  Descriptive fair use is conditioned on a trademark being 
used in good faith, as an adjective, rather than as an indicator of 
source.87  Under the fair use exception, individuals may advertise 
or promote their product in such a way “that permits consumers to 
                                                                                                             
83 See Tushnet, supra note 11, at 554. 
84 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c)(3)(B)–(C). 
85 Id. § 1125(c)(3)(A) 
86 See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 102–03 (2d Cir. 2010) (noting that 
eBay, is allowed to use brands’ trademarks to advertise the products being sold on its 
website, provided it does not imply the advertisement is being sponsored by the brand). 
87 See Kelly-Brown v. Winfrey, No. 11 Civ. 7875 (PAC), 2012 WL 701262, at *2–3 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2012), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 717 F.3d 295 (2d Cir. 2013).  The 
trademarked phrase “Own Your Power” was used as a headline on the cover of Oprah’s 
magazine to describe the contents of the magazine.  Moreover, the phrase could not be 
seen to indicate the source of the magazine where the “O” trademark, the title “The 
Oprah Magazine,” and the picture of Oprah were all prominently displayed. 
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compare goods or services[,]” and they may parody, criticize, or 
comment upon the famous mark’s goods, services, or owner.88 
One scholarly article compiled judicial interpretations of 
parody and defined it as a: “(1) literary or artistic work (2) that 
seeks to comment upon or criticize another work (3) by 
appropriating or mimicking elements of the original work, in order 
to (4) create a new art work that makes ridiculous the style and 
expression of the original (5) in a humorous fashion.”89  To find a 
parody, the use must be one that specifically comments upon the 
famous mark, rather than simply a lifestyle or social trend.90  
Similarly, the parody exception does not apply where a mark is 
humorously portrayed just to promote the infringer’s own 
product.91  Requiring the brand, rather than society, be parodied 
has proven helpful in cases—it lessens the chances that the 
consumer will mistakenly believe that the challenged use was 
sponsored by or affiliated with the mark owner.92  One of the 
earlier cases to be examined under the TDRA was Louis Vuitton 
Malletier, S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, L.L.C.93 
Haute Diggity Dog produces designer-inspired dog toys, such 
as plush “Chewy Vuiton” handbags that are monogrammed with 
                                                                                                             
88 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A). 
89 Justin J. Gunnell, Evaluation of the Dilution-Parody Paradox in the Wake of the 
Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, 26 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 441, 465–66 
(2008). 
90 See Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Hyundai Motor Am., No. 10 Civ. 1611(PKC), 
2012 WL 1022247, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2012) (declining to find that the use of a 
trademark was a parody where the infringing commercial’s intent was to avoid 
commenting directly on the product owner’s mark). 
91 See id. at *19 (citing Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Grottanelli, 164 F.3d 806, 813 (2d 
Cir. 1999)). 
92 See id. at *23–24 (noting evidence from Twitter that showed actual consumer 
confusion as to whether Louis Vuitton sponsored the Hyundai ad, a possible result of the 
ad being a social rather than brand-specific commentary); see also Rosenblatt, supra note 
20, at 1053 (explaining that people are less prone to believe that a markholder sponsored 
a use of its mark if that use is negative or one that a typical markholder would not 
authorize). 
93 See generally Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, L.L.C., 507 F.3d 
252, 262 (4th Cir. 2007) (noting that Haute Diggity Dog’s parody of the Louis Vuitton 
trademark for dog toys that were designed and sold did not prevent the court from finding 
the use to be a parody). 
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“CV” marks and colored in Louis Vuitton inspired hues.94  The 
Fourth Circuit found this use, despite its commercial nature, to be 
an unquestionable example of a parody because, while the marks 
on the Chewy Vuiton chew toy are aimed to invoke those on a 
Louis Vuitton purse, the use was found to be in the spirit of humor 
and mockery.95  Moreover, the Fourth Circuit found that the fame 
of Louis Vuitton’s mark helped prevent confusion and furthered 
Haute Diggity Dog’s endeavor to create a successful parody.96 
2. The Noncommercial Use Exception 
The legislative history of the TDRA defined commercial 
speech as that arising from the commercial speech doctrine and 
judicial precedent.97  One example of noncommercial speech is 
artistic expression, the primary form that will be discussed in this 
Note.98  In Schad v. Mount Ephraim, the Supreme Court explicitly 
provided free speech protection to artistic works including “motion 
pictures, programs broadcast by radio and television and live 
entertainment such as musical and dramatic works.”99  The 
Supreme Court first provided this protection to movies in Joseph 
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, because movies are informative and 
entertaining.100  The case then analogized movies to books, 
newspapers, and magazines, finding that the profit-making nature 
of each of these works was insufficient to deny free speech 
protection.101  Various courts have followed the logic of these 
                                                                                                             
94 Id. at 260.  Other designer-inspired dog toys include “Chewnel No. 5,” “Furcedes,” 
“Jimmy Chew,” “Dog Perignon,” “Sniffany and Co.,” and “Dogior.” Id. at 258. 
95 Id. at 259–61 (noting the witty disparity between a luxury bag that is preserved in 
good condition and a dog toy meant to be chewed and torn apart, the Fourth Circuit found 
Haute Diggity Dog’s product to “convey two simultaneous—and contradictory—
messages: that it is the original, but also that it is not the original and is instead a 
parody”) (quoting People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 263 F. 3d 
359, 366 (4th Cir. 2001)). 
96 Id. at 261–62. 
97 See H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 4, 8 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 
1031, 1035. 
98 See Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 812 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(which restated the rule that artistic expression is noncommercial speech). 
99 Schad v. Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65 (1981). 
100 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson 343 U.S. 495, 501–02 (1952). 
101 Id. 
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holdings and extended it to include other forms of profit driven 
entertainment such as comic books, T-shirts, and video games.102 
In Rogers v. Grimaldi, the Second Circuit prescribed a test to 
determine the level of free speech protection afforded artistic 
works.103  It narrowly defined the occasions when artistic works 
may be found in violation of the Lanham Act.104  It explained that 
the Act will only apply where the mark “has no artistic relevance 
to the underlying work whatsoever, or, if it . . . explicitly misleads 
as to the source or the content of the work.”105  Though the burden 
to prove artistic relevance under the Rogers test is low, where a 
mark is overtly misleading, it will not be exempted from the 
Lanham Act.106  With this in mind, it is understandable that the 
artistic relevance of product placement is often debated. 
D. Product Placement 
Product placement is the calculated inclusion of a product and 
its trademark in media, which then creates an association between 
the product and the popular film or television show.107  The 
presence of particularly placed products dates back to at least 1896 
when the Lumière Brothers strategically included Sunlight Soap in 
their short film Washing Day in Switzerland.108  Traditionally, 
product placement occurred when a trademark was incorporated 
into media in exchange for compensation by the markholder—be it 
in the form of money and/or advertising.109  The practice took off 
in the 1950s and has been growing in popularity ever since.110  To 
                                                                                                             
102 6 MCCARTHY, supra note 52, § 31:139. 
103 Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989). 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 Id.; see also Dillinger, L.L.C. v. Elec. Arts Inc., No. 1:09-CV-1236-JMS-DKL, 2011 
WL 2457678, at *6 (S.D. Ind. June 16, 2011) (“[A]ny connection whatsoever is enough 
for the Court to determine that the mark’s use meets ‘the appropriately low threshold of 
minimal artistic relevance.’”) (quoting Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999); Volkswagen A.G. v. 
Dorling Kindersley Publ’g, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 2d 793, 810 (E.D. Mich. 2009) (“[A] slight 
risk of customer confusion will not necessarily defeat a First Amendment defense.”). 
107 See Harris, supra note 24, at 311; see also Rosenblatt, supra note 20, at 1027–28. 
108 See Len Glickman & Anita Kim, Product Placement and Technology: 
Developments, Opportunities, and Challenges, 30 ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 1, 30 (2012). 
109 See Rosenblatt, supra note 20, at 1028. 
110 See id. 
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appear in the James Bond film Skyfall, companies paid a 
significant portion of the $200 million production costs of the 
movie.111  Heineken, alone, was responsible for 45 million of those 
dollars.112  However, for all of the companies paying to be 
incorporated into movies and television, there are occasions where 
product placement is unsponsored.113  Moreover, as viewers have 
grown to believe that every instance of product placement must be 
sponsored or approved by the markholder, it is questionable 
whether they can discern the authorized from the unauthorized 
uses.114 
E. The Reasonably Prudent Consumer 
In determining the likelihood that a consumer will be misled as 
to the origin of a product due to trademark dilution, a consumer’s 
sophistication may be considered.115  The Supreme Court defined 
the reasonably prudent purchaser in 1878 as an “ordinary 
purchaser in the exercise of ordinary care and caution.”116  Later 
courts have expanded on this to describe the reasonably prudent 
purchaser as “reasonably discerning,”117 reasonably intelligent and 
discriminating,118 and able to settle matters of “confusion with a 
minimum of effort and average intelligence (for the particular 
market).”119  Factors contributing to consumer sophistication have 
been found by courts to include the price of the product, the 
                                                                                                             
111 See Benjamin Radford, Branding James Bond: Do Product-Placement Ads Work?, 
LIVE SCI. (Nov. 21, 2012, 8:21 AM), http://www.livescience.com/24957-james-bond-
product-placement.html. 
112 See id. 
113 See Will Perkins, ‘Flight’: Budweiser and Stolichnaya Product Placement Gone 
Wrong?, WIDESCREEN (Nov. 7, 2012, 3:03 PM), http://ca.movies.yahoo.com/blogs/wide-
screen/flight-budweider-product-placement-gone-wrong-200352757.html. 
114 See Rosenblatt, supra note 20, at 1040. 
115 See Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Hyundai Motor Am., No. 10 Civ. 1611 (PKC), 
2012 WL 1022247, at *21 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2012). 
116 McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245, 255 (1877). 
117 Farm Serv., Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 414 P.2d 898, 909 (1966). 
118 See Dell Publ’g Co. v. Stanley Publ’ns, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 126, 134 (1961). 
119 Church of Larger Fellowship Unitarian Universalist v. Conservation Law Found. of 
New England, Inc., No. 80-183, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15855, at *13 (D. Mass. June 29, 
1983). 
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purchasing process, consumers’ familiarity with the product, and 
the purchaser’s overall knowledge.120 
In Roederer v. J. Garcia Carrion, S.A., consumers’ reliance on 
wine labels and similarity of names caused sparkling wine 
purchasers to incorrectly believe that the manufacturers of Cristal 
champagne also produced Cristalino.121  Beyond the similar names, 
the labels of Cristal and Cristalino were notably alike—both had 
gold front and neck labels with burgundy or maroon accents and 
used similar typefaces.122  This was especially deceptive when the 
two products were sold in the same stores and advertised in the 
same publications.123  Though the price points may have been 
different, this is not always enough to dissuade the sophisticated 
consumer from finding the products to be associated.124  Even 
advertisers believed the two marks to be related, calling Cristalino 
“the other Cristal” or Cristal’s “younger brother.”125  For these 
reasons, a significant portion of the surveyed consumers were 
confused about the brands’ association, and whether Cristal was 
the source or sponsor of Cristalino.126  The owner of a liquor store 
was even unsure of the nature of the Cristal-Cristalino 
relationship.127  Where consumers are blurring brands in spite of 
using care, and in some cases professional judgment and decades 
of experience, courts typically find that the reasonable consumer 
would find brand association.128  When a trademark’s presence in 
product placement is unauthorized, the question of whether the 
reasonable consumer would assume a relationship, and whether 
they might deem the use commercial or advertising enters into a 
judge’s decision-making.129 
                                                                                                             
120 See Arrow Fastening Co. v. Stanley Works, 59 F.3d 384, 399 (2d Cir. 1995). 
121 Roederer v. J. Garcia Carrion, S.A., 732 F. Supp. 2d 836, 877 (D. Minn. 2010). 
122 Id. at 846, 849. 
123 Id. at 868–69. 
124 Id. at 842–43 (noting that most Champagne producers also have a less expensive 
wine that they market to consumers). 
125 Id. at 853. 
126 Id. at 877. 
127 Id. at 860. 
128 See Xtreme Lashes, L.L.C. v. Xtended Beauty, Inc., 576 F.3d 221, 231 (5th Cir. 
2009). 
129 See Roederer, 732 F. Supp. 2d at 877–78. 
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II. THE DIVERGING HOLDINGS ON TRADEMARK USE IN 
UNSPONSORED PRODUCT PLACEMENT 
Courts and scholars have differed over how to regard 
trademark law in product placement.130  Some argue that product 
placement use is an expressive noncommercial use.131  Others, 
however, argue that the use of a trademark in unauthorized product 
placement is advertising, which by its nature is commercial.132  
The proponents of commercial use and dilution argue that blurring 
ensues from viewers’ mistaken belief that the unauthorized use of a 
mark in product placement is instead a sponsored use.133  
Proponents of the contrary view assert that sophisticated 
consumers can distinguish the use, or alternatively, that the use is 
protected as a parody.134  These contrasting holdings show that 
Elizabeth Rosenblatt, a professor at Whittier Law School, is 
correct in noting that courts are at odds when it comes to labeling 
unsponsored product placement a commercial or noncommercial 
use.135 
A. Courts Have Found the Use of a Trademark in Product 
Placement to be Expressive and Artistically Relevant 
Pratheenan Gulasekaram, a professor teaching at Santa Clara 
Law, explains that movies are “primarily and overwhelmingly 
noncommercial expressions with commercial elements sprinkled 
throughout their artistic message.”136  Courts following this 
reasoning and the Rogers v. Grimaldi test find the unauthorized 
use of a mark in product placement to be an artistic use that is not 
                                                                                                             
130 See Rosenblatt, supra note 20, at 1059–60. 
131 See Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Policing the Border Between Trademarks and Free 
Speech: Protecting Unauthorized Trademark Use in Expressive Works, 80 WASH. L. 
REV. 887, 936 (2005) (asserting that movies are noncommercial expressions that 
incidentally contain commercial elements). 
132 See Matthew Savare, Where Madison Avenue Meets Hollywood and Vine: The 
Business, Legal, and Creative Ramifications of Product Placements, 11 UCLA ENT. L. 
REV. 331, 369–75 (2004). 
133 See Rosenblatt, supra note 20, at 1053 (explaining the theory that consumers have 
become increasingly aware of product placement and assume authorized use). 
134 See Gulasekaram, supra note 131, at 929–31. 
135 Rosenblatt, supra note 20, at 1059. 
136 Gulasekaram, supra note 131, at 936. 
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subject to the Lanham Act.137  Gulasekaram notes what movie and 
television producers and directors argue—that the ultimate goal is 
sale of the movie, television show, or media product, not the sale 
of the product featured in the show.138  This argument, that the use 
of a trademark in film is artistic, governed the Southern District of 
New York’s holding in Louis Vuitton Mallatier, S.A. v. Warner 
Brothers Entertainment Inc., which held that the use of an 
unsponsored, and in fact counterfeit, Louis Vuitton bag in The 
Hangover Part II was an artistic use.139  The “Lewis Vuitton” bag 
was found to help unveil the character of its wearer, Alan, a 
socially awkward, utterly oblivious individual.140  Accordingly, it 
qualified as artistically relevant.141 
Courts and scholars have found the use of a mark as product 
placement to be expressive.142  Some go so far as to explain that 
the trademark chosen is a superfluous detail, and omitting it would 
not alter the final product, be it a movie, film, or some other media 
production.143  Rosenblatt, in contrast, asserts that marks can be 
more artistically relevant when they are used more realistically and 
symbolically.144  This makes the mark’s use more necessary than 
Gulasekaram, for example, finds.145  Rosenblatt explains that in 
such seemingly genuine uses, viewers are disposed to later 
associate the mark with a positive memory, no matter whether the 
mark was depicted in a positive or negative light.146  Because the 
mark is being used in such an expressive context, the use is labeled 
noncommercial and is found not to dilute the strength of a mark.147  
No matter why the mark is expressive, both authors argue that the 
                                                                                                             
137 See Louis Vuitton Mallatier S.A. v. Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc., 868 F. Supp. 2d 172, 
178 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
138 Gulasekaram, supra note 131, at 936. 
139 Louis Vuitton, 868 F. Supp. 2d at 178. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. 
142 See id.; see also Gulasekaram, supra note 131, at 936. 
143 See Gulasekaram, supra note 131, at 936. 
144 See Rosenblatt, supra note 20, at 1057 (citing studies of viewers’ reactions to 
realistic use of trademarks versus gratuitous uses). 
145 Compare id. with Gulasekaram, supra note 131, at 936. 
146 Rosenblatt, supra note 20, at 1057. 
147 Id. at 1060. 
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use is noncommercial and not based in advertising.148  Those 
paying for a mark to be used in product placement, however, 
disagree with the notion that the advertising purpose is 
irrelevant.149 
B. Contrary to Some Courts’ Holdings, Markholders Paying for 
Their Trademarks to Appear as Product Placement Intend the 
Use to Increase Brand Recognition 
Although some courts and scholars assert that directors only 
endeavor to sell films, brands paying for product placement intend 
for movie and television viewership to ultimately encourage their 
products’ sales.150  Additionally, companies are investing in 
product placement as a way to overcome the increased number of 
viewers who use digital video recorders like TiVo to fast-forward 
through commercials.151  A company’s aspiration to improve its 
product sales through product placement appears reasonable since 
history has revealed a correlation between the two.152  Products 
seen in films have been found to entice consumers, resulting in 
increased sales of the trademarked product.153  After the release of 
E.T. The Extra-Terrestrial, sales of Reese’s Pieces tripled.154  The 
movie Sideways encouraged wine drinkers to buy 22% more 
bottles of Pinot Noir.155  Tom Cruise’s stint in Ray-Ban Wayfarer 
sunglasses in Risky Business prompted consumers to buy 
themselves a pair.156  Ray-Ban benefited again in 1997 after the 
release of Men in Black, where the placement of its Predator 2 
sunglasses prompted a 300% increase in sales, totaling almost five 
                                                                                                             
148 See id.; Gulasekaram, supra note 131, at 936. 
149 See Radford, supra note 111 (explaining that product placement may improve a 
brand’s “cool factor” and it has the goal of increasing product sales). 
150 Compare Gulasekaram, supra note 131, at 936, with Glickman & Kim, supra note 
108, at 31–32. 
151 See Glickman & Kim, supra note 108, at 31. 
152 See Radford, supra note 111 (noting that although correlation does not necessarily 
imply causation, product placement has continued to result in multi-million dollar 
sponsorship deals). 
153 See Gulasekaram, supra note 131, at 932. 
154 See Rosenblatt, supra note 20, at 1029. 
155 See id. at 1030. 
156 See Glickman & Kim, supra note 110, at 30. 
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million dollars.157  The opposite response can also occur—after 
Clark Gable was seen sans undershirt in the movie It Happened 
One Night, sales of men’s undershirts dropped approximately 
40%.158 
Beyond having an effect on sales, trademarks have helped, and 
continue to help, carve out storylines and characters.159  James 
Bond is partially defined by his Aston Martin, his Omega watch, 
his never-ending collection of gadgets, and his vodka martini, 
shaken, not stirred.160  Carrie Bradshaw became an unofficial 
spokeswoman for Manolo Blahniks.161  The movie Le Divorce 
repeatedly gave screen time to the Hermès Kelly Bag that Kate 
Hudson’s character toted around Paris and eventually tossed over 
the side of the Eiffel Tower.162  And, what is The Italian Job 
without racing Mini Coopers?163 
                                                                                                             
157 See VIKI ANTONOPOULOU, GEOR. NAT’L FILM CTR., PRODUCT PLACEMENT IN FILM 5 
(Geor. Nat’l Film Ctr., 2010), available at http://www.yumpu.com/en/document/view/
3504704/product-placement-in-film. 
158 See Rosenblatt, supra note 20, at 1030–32 (describing the product placement 
relationship as “symbiotic”). 
159 See id. at 1027; see also Denise E. DeLorme & Leonard N. Reid, Moviegoers’ 
Experiences and Interpretations of Brands in Films Revisited, 28 J. ADVERTISING 71, 79 
(1999); Glickman & Kim, supra note 108, at 31 (explaining that product placement can 
improve the authenticity of a film and help viewers better understand and even empathize 
with the plot and characters). 
160 See Julian Sancton, For Your Ads Only: 50 Years of James Bond Product 
Placement, BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 5, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-
04-05/for-your-ads-only-50-years-of-james-bond-product-placement (mentioning that 
fans are so accustomed to the idea of James Bond’s vodka martini that they felt 
“betrayed” upon finding out he would be a Heineken drinker in Skyfall, and called the 
switch “sacrilege”). 
161 See Guy Trebay, In His Shoes, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/16/fashion/manolo-blahnik-shoes-regain-it-status-in-
fashion-world.html?_r=0&adxnnl=1&ref=sexandthecity&adxnnlx=1351969309-
vqIypPyfsqAfq949AawAvg (describing how Sarah Jessica Parker’s portrayal of Carrie 
Bradshaw in Sex and the City transformed luxury shoemaker Manolo Blahnik into a 
household name). 
162 See Jessica Michault, Stealthy Screen Time: Prime Placement for Luxury Brands, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/28/arts/28iht-fhollywood. 
1.5892325.html?pagewanted=all. 
163 See Behind the Scenes: “The Italian Job”, MOTORTREND (May 2003), 
http://www.motortrend.com/womt/112_0305_mini_bts/viewall.html?ti=v3 (calling the 
car “one of the stars of ‘The Italian Job’”). 
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Those specializing in product placement recognize that each of 
these trademarks has helped movie producers depict the real world, 
and their portrayal persuaded consumers to make these products a 
part of their everyday lives.164  In fact, Philip Morris’ 1989 
marketing plan recognized that “most of the strong, positive 
images for cigarettes and smoking are created by cinema and 
television . . . . It is reasonable to assume that films and 
personalities have more influence on consumers than a static 
poster.”165  This is in part because viewers perceive marks that are 
used artistically as being a character’s authentic preference.166  
Therefore, in striving to be like their favorite characters, viewers 
are quick to purchase these now cultural symbols.167 
In response to viewers’ copycat consumption habits, Congress 
enacted the Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act in 1965, which 
prohibits the advertisement of cigarettes via any “electronic 
communication” medium.168  In spite of this Act, Philip Morris 
cigarettes continued to be featured in movies such as Grease, 
Rocky II, Airplane, and Die Hard.169  The presence of cigarettes in 
film, which is intended to promote society’s tolerance of cigarettes, 
prompted statutory and common law restrictions upon using 
cigarettes in product placement.170  This example helps to elucidate 
the palpable clash between the camp advocating artistic expression 
and those relying on the artistic use to increase the sales of its 
products.  Courts, unsure of where to draw the advertising-art line, 
have wavered in their decisions and the routes they take to reach 
their holdings. 
                                                                                                             
164 See Rosenblatt, supra note 20, at 1029–30, 1042; supra text accompanying notes 
155–60, 164. 
165 C. Mekemson & S.A. Glantz, How the Tobacco Industry Built Its Relationship with 
Hollywood, 11 TOBACCO CONTROL 82 (2002) at i82, available at http://tobaccocontrol.
bmj.com/content/11/suppl_1/i81.full.pdf+html. 
166 See Rosenblatt, supra note 20, at 1057. 
167 See id. at 1057, 1030 (“Study participants who viewed the movie Wayne’s World in 
its entirety reported a purchase intention for placed brands that was 16% higher than for 
brands they had previously identified as ‘favorites.’”). 
168 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (2012). 
169 See Mekemson & Glantz, supra note 165, at i84. 
170 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1335; Council of Indep. Tobacco Mfrs. of Am. v. State, 713 
N.W.2d 300, 311 (Minn. 2006) (noting that the settling cigarette manufacturers must 
contribute money toward the health care costs that will arise from the use of their 
cigarettes); Mekemson & Glantz, supra note 165, at i89. 
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C. Some Courts Have Found Blurring as a Result of Unsponsored 
Product Placement Because Viewers are Mistakenly Finding 
Sponsorship 
One reason that some courts have found product placement to 
cause trademark dilution is the tendency of viewers to erroneously 
assume that the trademark use was paid for or approved by the 
markholder.171  Such implied sponsorship was found in Hyundai’s 
2010 Super Bowl commercial, Luxury, which featured a basketball 
with marks resembling Louis Vuitton’s trademark pattern: a 
“pinwheel design, a diamond with an inset pinwheel design, and a 
circle with an inset flower design.”172  The Louis Vuitton 
basketball was admitted to have been embedded in the Hyundai 
commercial to improve Hyundai’s reputation and create an image 
that was more stylish and luxurious.173  This new-and-improved 
image was unveiled on the televisions of the 106.5 million 
Americans who watched the 2010 Super Bowl.174  Some of those 
who viewed the commercial then tweeted about the “LV 
basketball,” demonstrating that members of the commercial’s 
audience had actually associated Louis Vuitton with the 
advertisement and thought that the brand had been involved.175  
Louis Vuitton contended that it was harmed by this consumer 
deception because while “Hyundai ‘aspires’ to be a luxury brand, 
[it] is not comparable to Louis Vuitton.”176  The commercial ended 
                                                                                                             
171 See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
172 Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Hyundai Motor Am., No. 10 Civ. 1611(PKC), 2012 
WL 1022247, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2012).  The pattern on the basketball was held to 
be “virtually indistinguishable” from the Louis Vuitton mark. Id. at *7. 
173 Id. at *3 (Joel Ewanick, a former Hyundai marketing executive testified that “[t]he 
Hyundai brand is one with significant deficiencies when you ask consumers what they 
think about safety, what you think about amenities, what you think about styling, what 
you think about performance . . . .  But I would say generally speaking the idea was to 
reframe the way people looked at Hyundai, the brand, and specifically through the eyes 
of the Sonata.”). See generally Martin Nunlee et al., Negative Product Placement: An 
Evolving Theory of Product Disparagement and Unfair Competition, 6 J. MARKETING 
DEV. & COMPETITIVENESS 11, 14–19 (2012), available at http://www.na-
businesspress.com/JMDC/NunleeM_Web6_2_.pdf. 
174 See Jonathan Stempel, Louis Vuitton Sues Hyundai over Super Bowl Ad, REUTERS 
(Mar. 1, 2010, 2:06 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/03/01/louisvuitton-
superbowl-lawsuit-idUSN0125892920100301. 
175 Louis Vuitton, 2012 WL 1022247 at *11. 
176 Id. at *25. 
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by asking, “What if we made luxury available to everyone?”177  
For brands afraid of becoming part of the noise and losing 
distinction, however, availability is the wrong message; they want 
their trademarks to remain as luxurious as the goods they are 
selling.178 
The Southern District of New York agreed, finding that 
because Louis Vuitton’s “marks ‘are famous and distinctive’ as 
‘widely recognized luxury marks,’ and are ‘viewed by some as the 
most valuable luxury brand in the world[,]’” they are entitled to 
greater protection under dilution law.179  The six factors were 
applied to find (1) similarity, with the marks on the basketball 
declared “virtually indistinguishable” from those on a Louis 
Vuitton product; (2) Louis Vuitton’s mark is distinctive; (3) Louis 
Vuitton has engaged in “substantially exclusive” use of its mark; 
(4) Louis Vuitton’s mark is well recognized; (5) Hyundai’s 
association with the Louis Vuitton mark was purposeful; and (6) 
evidence of actual association between the two marks.180  
Accordingly, the Southern District of New York granted Louis 
Vuitton’s motion for summary judgment on trademark dilution.181  
Even though consumers may associate a trademark used in 
product placement with a character or plotline, today’s astute 
audiences still recognize that the trademark exhibited is likely to be 
part of some larger marketing scheme.182  In fact, as seen through 
the tweets in Louis Vuitton v. Hyundai, they often believe that 
every brand portrayed must have either approved its use or paid for 
the screen time.183  Therefore, they are more likely to believe this 
brand-scene association was approved and voluntarily 
sponsored.184  The Second Circuit found in Louis Vuitton v. 
                                                                                                             
177 See Stempel, supra note 174. 
178 See Barton Beebe, Intellectual Property Law and the Sumptuary Code, 123 HARV. 
L. REV. 809, 829 (2010). 
179 Louis Vuitton, 2012 WL 1022247 at *8. 
180 Id. at *12–13. 
181 Id. at *14. 
182 See Radford, supra note 111 (“[C]onsumers . . . recognize ads for what they are.”). 
183 See Louis Vuitton, 2012 WL 1022247, at *11; see also William McGeveran, The 
Trademark Fair Use Reform Act, 90 B.U. L. REV. 2267, 2310 (2010) (explaining that 
viewers believe markholders are able to prevent their marks from being depicted in media 
as product placement). 
184 See McGeveran, supra note 183, at 2310. 
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Hyundai, however, that no matter the symbolic importance 
associated with the use of a particular trademark, the markholder 
was entitled to retain control over how its mark was being 
portrayed and what it was appearing to sponsor.185  This circuit has 
previously held that a senior user is never required to leave the 
strength and quality of its mark in the hands of another.186  
Accordingly, a senior user may enjoin a junior user who is adeptly 
managing its own business and causing no harm to the mark.187  In 
fact, courts have found that when the goods of a junior user are of 
a similar quality to those of a senior markholder, consumers are 
often more likely to blur the relationship between the two 
companies.188  The risk that consumers will be deceived and alter 
their perception of a mark due to the control exercised by media-
makers has encouraged some courts to find dilution as a result of 
unsponsored product placement.189  Other courts, striving to find 
artistic relevance, have found ways to excuse the unauthorized use. 
D. Courts Have Found that Consumers Can Dissociate a Brand’s 
Meaning from its Association in a Movie or Television Show 
Courts are more willing to find artistic use when they consider 
the reasonably prudent person standard, and hold that someone 
who is reasonably intelligent, discriminating, and careful can 
                                                                                                             
185 See Louis Vuitton, 2012 WL 1022247, at *13–14 (pointing out that Hyundai used 
Louis Vuitton’s mark to enhance its branding campaign and that Hyundai’s previous 
letters requesting the rights to the marks of thirteen companies indicates that Hyundai 
knew it did not have the right to use the Louis Vuitton mark to portray luxury). 
186 See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 259–60 (2d Cir. 
1987); U.S. Polo Ass’n v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 800 F. Supp. 2d 515, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011) (citing James Burrough, Ltd. v. Ferrara, 165 N.Y.S.2d 825, 826 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1957)).  In 1928, Judge Learned Hand wrote on behalf of the Second Circuit that a 
trademark is an “authentic seal; by it he vouches for the goods which bear it; it carries his 
name for good or ill.  If another uses it, he borrows the owner’s reputation, whose quality 
no longer lies within his own control.  This is an injury, even though the borrower does 
not tarnish it, or divert any sales by its use; for a reputation, like a face, is the symbol of 
its possessor and creator, and another can use it only as a mask.” Yale Elec. Corp. v. 
Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir. 1928). 
187 See Pegasus, 818 F.2d at 259–60. 
188 See Steven John Olsen, Mixed Signals in Trademark’s “Likelihood of Confusion 
Law”: Does Quality Matter?, 44 VAL. U. L. REV. 659, 677 n.58 (2010). 
189 See Louis Vuitton, 2012 WL 1022247, at *13. 
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discern sponsored from unsponsored uses.190  This is in part 
because goods are typically viewed in a narrow context.191  Just as 
the words spoken in a conversation help listeners hone in on what 
is being discussed, details of the setting, plot, and dialogue permit 
individuals seeing trademarks in product placement to distinguish 
the brand’s reputation from the context in which it is being 
portrayed.192  Such explanatory context was found to exist in 
Caterpillar, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., a case revolving around Walt 
Disney’s unauthorized use of Caterpillar bulldozers in the film 
George of the Jungle 2.193  The Caterpillar bulldozers assisted in 
the evil villain’s efforts to destroy Ape Mountain.194  The Central 
District of Illinois found that viewers, even the more gullible ones 
such as children, would recognize that Caterpillar bulldozers were 
not “maniacal machines,” responsible for the attempted destruction 
of Ape Mountain.195  Similarly, trademark scholars like Mark 
McKenna found it unlikely that the scene in the NBC television 
show Heroes, where an InSinkErator garbage disposal crushed a 
main character’s hand, had tarnished the InSinkErator mark.196  
Viewers could likely disassociate the mark from the television 
show.197  In fact, dilution requires a mark to still be able to 
distinguish itself from its surroundings.198  Therefore, as Laura 
Heymann, a professor at William and Mary Law School, argues, 
neither positive nor negative uses of a mark in product placement 
will affect the brand’s reputation in such a way that it causes 
trademark dilution.199  This argument would allow judges to avoid 
                                                                                                             
190 See McKenna, supra note 60, at 83–84 (“[T]he confusion [is] generating search 
costs only if we think the mental act of wondering is the search cost.”). 
191 See Tushnet, supra note 11, at 529–30. 
192 See id. at 531 (noting that the ability to distinguish between the brand and its 
nontrademark descriptive meaning, as seen with Swift, Life Savers, and Ivory, is based 
upon it being seen in a categorical product context versus in the abstract). 
193 Caterpillar, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 287 F. Supp. 2d 913 (C.D. Ill. 2003). 
194 Id. at 917. 
195 Id. at 922. 
196 See David Goetzi, Emerson Drops Product Placement Case Against NBC, MEDIA 
POST (Feb. 23, 2007, 8:33 AM), http://www.mediapost.com/publications/article/55990/
emerson-drops-product-placement-case-against-nbc.html#axzz2HKKWSpmc. 
197 See Heymann, supra note 1, at 1390–91. 
198 See id. at 1397. 
199 Id. at 1397–99. 
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deciding whether the use is commercial, and dismiss dilution on 
other grounds.200 
E. Courts Have Exempted the Use of a Trademark in 
Unsponsored Product Placement as a Parody 
When a trademark is displayed as a parody in product 
placement, the use is not actionable under the TDRA.201  While 
these uses sometimes seem to cause harm to the mark and 
markholders, courts are hesitant to leap from parody to tarnishment 
because negative uses are typically found to be expressive rather 
than commercial.202  This was seen where the Muppets character 
Spa’am, a pig, was not found to be a “grotesque boar” that was 
“unhygienic” and tarnishing the SPAM trademark, but rather 
deemed “untidy” and a parody of the canned ham lunchmeat.203  
When Family Guy featured a caricature of Carol Burnett mopping 
the floors in a sex shop as the theme song to the Carol Burnett 
Show played in the background, the Central District of California 
was quick to label the use an artistic work meant to “lampoon and 
parody her as a public figure.”204  Although not product placement, 
in Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., even the sale of t-shirts, mugs, 
underwear, teddy bears, and bumper stickers adorned with phrases 
meant to associate Walmart with Al-Qaeda and Nazis, was found 
to be non-commercial.205  Although the shirts were being sold on 
the Internet, their essential function remained as a medium of 
expression rather than a profit-making venture.206 
                                                                                                             
200 See Caterpillar, 287 F. Supp. 2d at 922 (deciding against trademark dilution by 
tarnishment without considering whether the use was artistic or commercial). 
201 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A)(ii) (2012). 
202 See Rosenblatt, supra note 20, at 1014 (referencing the TDRA’s tarnishment 
protection which only protects against commercial uses). But see Louis Vuitton Malletier, 
S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, L.L.C., 507 F.3d 252 (4th Cir. 2007) (clearing a non-
tarnishing parody of liability on account of being humorous, in spite of its largely 
commercial nature). 
203 See Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods. Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 501, 503 (2d Cir. 
1997) (finding Spa’am to be a humorous character in line with Henson’s other Muppet 
parodies). 
204 See Burnett v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 491 F. Supp. 2d 962, 969 (C.D. 
Cal. 2007). 
205 Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1339–40 (N.D. Ga. 2008). 
206 See id. 
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In some cases, simply creating a witty parody has been enough 
to overcome a trademark dilution action.207  One court was so 
tickled by a parody that it ignored the crude nature of a joke and 
explained that its “unsavory or controversial quality [would] render 
the parody less capable of causing public confusion and therefore 
less susceptible to infringement liability.”208  While a court will 
almost certainly find parody protection for a wholesome comedy, 
where the humor is more taboo, the outcome appears to depend on 
the tastes and predilection of the deciding court.209  The laughter 
induced by the Chewy Vuitton toys proved sufficient to drown out 
any claims of dilution.210  The Southern District of New York also 
found the humor apparent enough to differentiate Timmy 
Holedigger pet perfumes from those of Tommy Hilfiger, and label 
the use a parody.211  Humor theory explains that social norms help 
to establish what society finds funny, so it can and often does 
guide litigants, attorneys, and courts in deciding whether to view 
an unpermitted trademark use as a parody.212 
Although parody should remain an exception to the TDRA, as 
parodies become more offensive, like the one in Smith v. Wal-Mart 
Stores, marks will be harmed.213  Scholars have noted the trend in 
courts to exempt such uses from liability as tarnishment.214  This is 
                                                                                                             
207 See Assaf, supra note 55, at 63. 
208 Laura E. Little, Regulating Funny: Humor and the Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1235, 
1268–69 (2009); see also Burnett, 491 F. Supp. 2d at 972–73; Rosenblatt, supra note 20, 
at 1014 (noting that observers of the negative parody are unlikely to believe the 
markholder approved or sponsored the portrayal). 
209 See Assaff, supra note 46, at 64–66; see also id. at 63 (noting a case in which a 
movie referenced a brand “BUFU,” “By Us, Fuck You,” which the good-humored judge 
concluded to be a protected parody of the trademark “FUBU,” “For Us, By Us,” and a 
“UFUB” cause of action, “Utterly Frivolous Under Biopsy”). 
210 See Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, L.L.C., 507 F.3d 252, 267 
(4th Cir. 2007). 
211 See Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, Inc. v. Nature Labs, L.L.C., 221 F. Supp. 2d 410, 
417 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (looking to phrases on the packaging that read “[s]trong enough for 
a man, but made for a Chihuahua” or “T. Holedigger keeps your best friend smelling 
fresh and clean” to reaffirm the comedic and parodic nature of Nature Labs’ pet 
perfumes). 
212 See Little, supra note 208, at 1284 (“[P]arody is an integral component of American 
culture that should be treasured and protected, even in the face of a claim of harm.”). 
213 See Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1316 (N.D. Ga. 2008). 
214 See Rosenblatt, supra note 20, at 1074. 
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perhaps in part because of the murky terrain of unsponsored 
product placement. 
In response to the discrepancy in courts’ treatment of 
trademarks in unsponsored product placement, I propose the 
creation of a rule. 
III. FAMOUS TRADEMARKS USED IN PRODUCT PLACEMENT SHOULD 
BE DESIGNATED A COMMERCIAL USE 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes very wisely pronounced that 
“‘[i]t would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to 
the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth [of an 
artistic work], outside the narrowest and most obvious limits.’”215  
Katya Assaf, a professor of Law at the Hebrew University of 
Jerusalem, explained that not only do judges differ in what they 
qualify as art, but different judges also have different senses of 
humor and accordingly vary in what they label a parody.216  
Rosenblatt further explained that where an entertainment use 
primarily features product placement, courts struggle over whether 
to consider the purpose to be advertisement or noncommercial.217  
Accordingly, there should be a bright line rule that unsponsored 
product placement is a commercial use.  This rule provides narrow 
limits as Holmes recommended.  Considerations in reaching this 
decision include: (1) the need for markholders and media-makers 
to know when they may use a trademark, (2) the media’s position 
as an instrument of commerce, and (3) reputational concerns for 
brands who desire to preserve the goodwill in their marks and 
cannot rely on sophisticated consumers to discern the truth.  
Without the protection provided by markholders’ prior approval, 
trademarks used in unauthorized product placement face the threat 
of dilution. 
                                                                                                             
215 Gulasekaram, supra note 131, at 913–14 (quoting Bleistein v. Donaldson 
Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903)). 
216 Assaf, supra note 55, at 60. 
217 Rosenblatt, supra note 20, at 1059. 
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A. Lack of a Bright Line Rule Has Resulted in Confusion Among 
Markholders and Media-Makers 
In deciding whether there has been dilution, the TDRA has 
judges consider “[t]he extent to which the owner of the famous 
mark is engaging in substantially exclusive use of the mark.”218  
Without such protection, a trademark may become generic.219  
Louis Vuitton was adequately found to protect its mark due to 
evidence that it “‘initiated’ 9,489 anti-counterfeiting raids and 
26,843 anti-counterfeiting procedures,” and responded to Customs 
Seizure Notices with 217 cease-and-desist letters in 2009.220  Then 
in 2010, it sent an additional 499 cease-and-desist letters.221  The 
degree of protection Louis Vuitton exerted in policing its mark 
resulted in Hyundai’s unauthorized use being labeled dilutive.222  
The understood need to protect one’s mark causes trademark use in 
unapproved product placement to wind up in newsrooms and 
courtrooms. 
A recent incident of unsponsored product placement breaking 
into headlines demonstrates this uncertainty.  The movie Flight 
repeatedly shows Denzel Washington’s alcoholic character 
drinking Budweiser beer, on one occasion even while he is driving 
a car.223  This use had not been approved by Anheuser-Busch, and 
the company is accordingly requesting its trademark be blurred or 
otherwise obscured.224  For Paramount, the decision was likely the 
result of Budweiser’s brand identity—it is a beer that they felt a 
middle-aged, unpretentious character might prefer.225  Having the 
character reach for a Budweiser perhaps seemed more realistic.226  
                                                                                                             
218 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B)(iii) (2012). 
219 See, e.g., Freecycle Network, Inc. v. Oey, 505 F.3d 898, 905 (9th Cir. 2007); 
Premier Nutrition, Inc. v. Organic Food Bar, Inc., No. SACV 06-0827 AG (RNBx), 2008 
WL 1913163, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2008). 
220 Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Hyundai Motor Am., No. 10 Civ. 1611 (PKC), 2012 
WL 1022247, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2012). 
221 Id. 
222 Id. 
223 See Brooke Olaussen, Who Controls Trademarks in Films?, INTELL. PROP. BRIEF 
(Nov. 24, 2012, 5:10 PM), http://www.ipbrief.net/2012/11/24/who-controls-trademarks-
in-films. 
224 See id. 
225 See id. 
226 See id. 
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For those in the Anheuser-Busch camp, however, there is likely the 
apprehension that viewers think every product used on screen has 
been approved, and therefore will think this incident of product 
placement is evidence of Budweiser endorsing alcoholism and 
drunk driving.227  Stolichnaya has made similar complaints 
pertaining to the screentime given to its vodka.228  To preserve the 
Budweiser and Stoli trademarks from dilution, these incidences of 
unsponsored product placement should be held commercial uses 
that necessitate the markholders’ prior approval. 
Establishing a rule that makes the use of a trademark in product 
placement a commercial use that requires the markholder’s 
permission, is consistent with dilution law.  Under the TDRA, a 
markholder seeking to prevent dilution must police its mark’s 
use.229  The question of whether to regulate a trademark’s use 
should not be a guessing game, where media-makers and 
markholders must decide when they can employ, and 
correspondingly when they must protect, the use of a mark in 
product placement.  Rather, authorization prior to exhibiting a 
mark should be required in all situations except those explicitly 
stated.  The TDRA currently exempts comparative advertising, 
parody, criticism, comment, news, and noncommercial uses from 
dilution law.230  However, as media moves online, televisions 
advance to integrate the Internet, and product placement of famous 
marks serves an intrinsic advertising function, it has become clear 
that the use of a mark in product placement must be found 
commercial. 
B. Unsponsored Product Placement in Media Should be Likened 
to the Internet and Similarly Made a Commercial Use 
The Internet is regulated as a commercial use under the 
Lanham Act.231  Accordingly, where media is nearly always 
available over the Internet and where televisions connect to the 
Internet, television programming must similarly be labeled a 
                                                                                                             
227 See id.; see also McGeveran, supra note 183, at 2310. 
228 See Perkins, supra note 113. 
229 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B)(iii) (2012). 
230 Id. § 1125(c)(3). 
231 See supra text accompanying notes 32–39. 
2014] QUIET ON SET! 617 
 
commercial use.  Beyond simply connecting to the Internet, 
televisions are even beginning to function like the Internet.232  
Therefore, unsponsored product placement featured in movies and 
television must be found a use in commerce that requires the 
markholder’s approval to be displayed. 
1. Media is Streamed Online 
In a world where so much of media is concurrently distributed 
over the Internet, the media viewed must be found as a commercial 
use as anything else viewed over the Internet.233  Netflix’s CEO 
publicly predicted the company to continue losing DVD 
subscribers every quarter as online media streaming takes focus.234  
Laptops often do not even include DVD drives anymore.235  
Instead, people stream movies, or acquire them through the 
Internet.236  The situation is similar in the realm of television 
shows.  Hulu and network-operated websites allow viewers to 
stream shows to their computers at any time.237  Alternative 
                                                                                                             
232 Smart televisions enable viewers to watch Internet videos and socialize with friends 
online from their televisions. See Anick Jesdanun, Coming to a Smart TV near You: 
Software Confusion, NBC NEWS (Jan. 6, 2014, 5:11 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/
technology/new-software-battle-coming-smart-tvs-2D11869282.  Additionally, programs 
like Oohly allow someone viewing content on a television that connects to the Internet to 
select and purchase the clothing and props featured in a scene directly from their 
televisions. See also Alex Knapp, Oohly Wants to Kill the TV Commercial Forever, 
FORBES (Apr. 16, 2012, 12:46 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/alexknapp/2012/04/16/ 
oohly-wants-to-kill-the-tv-commercial-forever.  Thus a viewer may conduct an Internet-
like search and make an online purchase without ever leaving the couche to exchange the 
remote for a laptop with Internet access. 
233 See supra note 231. 
234 See David Pogue, How Hollywood is Encouraging Online Piracy, SCI. AM. (Aug. 
21, 2012), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=how-hollywood-encoura
ging-onine-piracy. 
235 See id. 
236 See id. 
237 See Gary Levin, Prime Time Seeks a Future in a When-You-Want-it World, USA 
TODAY (Nov. 15, 2012, 7:59 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/life/tv/2012/11/15/tv-
watching-in-more-places/1661293.  The ability to stream can result in increased 
viewership. See Richard Sandomir, Live (Streaming) From Russia, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 
2014, at B16, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/06/sports/olympics/live-
streaming-from-sochi.html?hpw&rref=sports&_r=0 (noting that the ability to watch the 
Olympic games on a laptop increased daily viewership from 4 hours and 19 minutes to 4 
hours and 28 minutes a day; adding in a mobile phone increased that number to 5 hours; 
and adding a tablet increased viewership to 6 hours and seven minutes). 
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options include purchasing shows or seasons through iTunes, 
Netflix, YouTube, HBO Go, and a paid version of Hulu.238  
Accordingly, where so many people are tuning into the Internet for 
their media fixes, television, movies, and the trademarks exhibited 
in product placement must similarly be viewed as commerce under 
the Lanham Act. 
2. Televisions Often Connect to the Internet and Thereby 
Function as Instruments in Commerce 
Beyond simply being streamed online, many modern 
televisions are now even connected to the Internet.239  
Accordingly, televisions must be labeled instruments of 
commerce—they are items that facilitate commercial 
transactions.240  Emerging programs, such as Oohly, permit 
televisions to provide much the same function as an Internet 
search.241  This application, for example, will permit viewers to 
purchase the products featured in the show they are watching while 
they are watching it or, alternatively, return later to search for the 
product they saw.242  In these instances, unsponsored product 
placement is functioning much like an advertisement. 
The finding that unsponsored product placement is an 
advertisement, however, does not hinge only on whether a 
television is connected to the Internet.  Because the TDRA only 
protects famous marks from dilution,243 and such marks have 
“extensive public recognition and renown,”244 their presence alone 
serves an advertising function.  Trademark dilution protects the 
communication value in a name, and famous designers have earned 
                                                                                                             
238 See Levin, supra note 237. 
239 See Sean P. Aune, Internet Connected TVs Expected to Hit 650 Million by 2017, 
TECHNOBUFFALO (Aug. 2, 2012), http://www.technobuffalo.com/2012/08/02/internet-
connected-tvs-expected-to-hit-650-million-by-2017 (noting that 650 million televisions 
are expected to be connected to the Internet in 2017, an amount that should yield $60 
billion in sales). 
240 See supra text accompanying notes 27–38. 
241 See Knapp, supra note 232. 
242 See id. 
243 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2012) (allowing injunctive relief only “after the owner’s 
mark has become famous”). 
244 Kenner Parker Toys Inc. v. Rose Art Indus., Inc., 963 F.2d 350, 353 (Fed. Cir. 
1992). 
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the household recognition that merits this protection from 
dilution.245  Therefore, whether connected to the Internet or merely 
relying on its own fame, the use of a mark in unsponsored product 
placement is an advertising use in commerce.  To further explain 
this, a comparison to keywords might prove helpful. 
Consider the similarities between the use of a famous mark in 
unsponsored product placement and the similarly deceptive use of 
a trademark as a search engine keyword.246  When a person 
searches a trademarked term on the Internet, if that mark is a 
search engine keyword, the results will engender the 
advertisements of the companies who have purchased that 
keyword, alongside or even preferential to those of the true 
markholder.247  This risks deluding searchers into believing the two 
companies are perhaps related.  Comparatively, viewers using 
applications like “Get the Look” are presented with similar, often 
more affordable looks, which may mislead consumers as to the 
actual designer of the product.248  Furthermore, programs like 
Oohly and “Get the Look” then provide the ability to purchase the 
merchandise.249  As Judge Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit explained, 
“[i]n a commercial environment, distribution and payment are . . . 
like love and marriage—you can’t have one without the other.  If 
cards don’t process payments, pirates don’t deliver booty.”250  This 
ability to later purchase the featured merchandise makes the 
product placement commercial.  Televisions have become an 
instrument of commerce.  One example of such deceptive product 
                                                                                                             
245 See Landes & Posner, supra note 18, at 307. 
246 See Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137, 
1144 (9th Cir. 2011). 
247 See Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 129 (2d Cir. 2009). 
248 See, e.g., U.S. Showbiz, MAILONLINE, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/usshowbiz/
index.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2014) (providing “Get the Look” links on several 
pictures). 
249 See id.; see also Knapp, supra note 232; Snooki’s Designer Bags Given to Her by 
Luxury Rivals, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 19, 2010, 10:59 AM), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/2010/08/19/snookis-designer-bags-col_n_687583.html [hereinafter 
Snooki’s Designer Bags].  In the scenario with Snooki and her handbags, viewers might 
think these designers endorsed the use and, accordingly, the show. 
250 Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv., Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788, 818 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(Kozinski, J., dissenting) (discussing vicarious liability in a copyright case where 
controlling payment was found by Judge Kozinski to be an essential part of the 
infringement). 
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placement that was not sponsored by the actual owner of the mark 
can be seen in the Jersey Shore. 
Snooki became a household name because of the Jersey Shore, 
and in Season One she could be seen toting her Coach handbag 
everywhere she went.251  Coach had not paid for this use and was 
not happy with how its mark was being portrayed.252  Prior to the 
start of Season Two, she was sent a smorgasbord of new handbags 
to wear, but again, these purses were not sent to her by their 
respective designers.253  Rather, they were sent by other luxury 
designers, including Coach, who were eager to prevent their own 
bags from being associated with either Snooki or the Jersey 
Shore.254  This act of “unbranding” used other recognizable luxury 
trademarks to deceive consumers.255  Viewers would recognize the 
famous trademarks on any of the bags designers had offered to 
Snooki and be deceived into finding sponsorship.256  Much like in 
the case of keywords, were this use to be found noncommercial, 
product placement would be allowed to continue using trademarks 
to deceive consumers.257  Instead authorization should be required 
before a mark may be used in product placement.  This will further 
protect the trademark from losing the goodwill in its reputation. 
                                                                                                             
251 See Nunlee, Smith & Katz, supra note 173, at 11. 
252 See Adam Fusfeld, Sleazy Celebs Inspire Brilliant New Marketing Strategy – 
“Unbranding”, BUSINESS INSIDER (Aug. 25, 2010, 11:50 AM), http://www.
businessinsider.com/snooki-is-so-bad-for-fashion-pr-that-she-inspired-an-evil-new-
strategy-2010-8. 
253 See id.; see also Nunlee, Smith & Katz, supra note 173, at 11. 
254 See Buckland, supra note 252. 
255 See Snooki’s Designer Bags, supra note 249. 
256 See id. 
257 See Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 130 (2d Cir. 2009) (“[T]he 
operators of search engines would be free to use trademarks in ways designed to deceive 
and cause consumer confusion.”). 
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C. Unsponsored Product Placement Harms a Trademark’s 
Reputation Because Sophisticated Consumers Cannot See 
Beyond the Deception 
Today’s media has tremendous implications because it reaches 
infinitely many more people and does so at an incredible speed.258  
While this has its advantages in times of disaster,259 political 
elections,260 and perhaps in the case of celebrity love lives, it also 
has its disadvantages—misinformation accompanies every piece of 
information.261  Therefore the truth behind incidences of 
unsponsored product placement is not always clear on the Internet.  
This problem would be solved if product placement was found to 
be a commercial use that required the markholder’s approval. 
Instead there are instances such Abercrombie and Fitch’s 
public announcement of its request for the “Situation,” another cast 
member on the Jersey Shore, to discontinue wearing its apparel.262  
Over one thousand members of the press took to their laptops to 
comment and respond.263  While many thought this to be a 
                                                                                                             
258 See, e.g., Tom Martin, Marketing at the Speed of Sound, CONVERSEDIGITAL (Dec. 
20, 2012), http://www.conversedigital.com/digital-strategy/podcasting-statistics-trends-
future. 
259 Compare Jerry Barmash, Former WNYW Anchor Jim Ryan Felt ‘Sick Feeling’ 
Covering Events of 9/11, FISHBOWL NY (Sept. 7, 2011, 11:00 AM), http://www.
mediabistro.com/fishbowlny/former-wnyw-anchor-jim-ryan-911-anniversary_b36819 
(noting the first news on the 9/11 terrorist attacks was broadcasted just two minutes after 
the first plane crash), with Radio Reports Japan’s Attack on Pearl Harbor, MODESTO 
RADIO MUSEUM, http://www.modestoradiomuseum.org/radio%20reports%20pearl.html 
(last visited Nov. 3, 2012) (informing that Pearl Harbor was attacked a little before 7:55 
AM HST but news of this was not broadcasted on major news until 30 minutes later). 
260 See Truth-O-Meter, POLITIFACT.COM, http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/
statements (last visited Nov. 3, 2012) (indicating the truthfulness of statements made 
during the political campaign). 
261 See Luke Allnutt, Why We’re More Likely than Ever Before to Believe Fake News, 
RADIO FREE EUR. RADIO LIBERTY (Sept. 10, 2012), http://www.rferl.org/content/why-
were-more-likely-than-ever-before-to-believe-fake-news/24701144.html. 
262 See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendants’ Motion and Memorandum of Law in 
Support of their Motion to Strike Irrelevant Material and Unsupported Allegations from 
Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint at ¶ 15, MPS Entm’t, L.L.C. v. Abercrombie & 
Fitch Stores, Inc., No. 11-CV-24110-LENARD/O’SULLIVAN, 2012 WL 3869091 (S.D. 
Fla. July 16, 2012) [hereinafter the Complaint]; The Latest ‘Situation’ for Abercrombie & 
Fitch and Jersey Shore, TELEGRAPH (Aug. 19, 2011), http://fashion.telegraph.co.uk/news-
features/TMG8710673/The-latest-Situation-for-Abercrombie-and-Fitch-and-Jersey-
Shore.html. 
263 See Complaint, supra note 262, ¶ 17. 
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publicity stunt on the part of Abercrombie and Fitch, there was, 
and remains to be, no certainty.264  Information is simply not 
always available.  When a Mad Men episode had a Jaguar 
executive promising to accept the advertising firm’s representation 
in exchange for sex with a member of the firm, the actual Jaguar 
tweeted its response, in hopes of disassociating the car company 
from the unauthorized product placement.265  The only problem 
with its rejoinder lies in the fact that 34.5% of the population is on 
neither Facebook nor Twitter, so it is doubtful they would ever see 
Jaguar’s tweet.266 
Additionally, studies show that people with strong opinions are 
more likely to stand firmly in their convictions when faced with 
mounds of opposition.267  This response, known as belief 
perseverance, strengthens as the amount of information 
contradicting one’s beliefs grows.268  Further, by the reasoning 
applied in the aptly called Law of Incorrect Tweets, “[i]nitial, 
inaccurate information will be retweeted more than any subsequent 
correction.”269  The breadth of available misinformation is 
especially troublesome because researchers have found that people 
are growing more gullible.270  And, this dilemma is only inflated 
because everything posted on the Internet lives on forever.271  
Accordingly, being a sophisticated consumer may no longer be 
                                                                                                             
264 See id. 
265 See Christopher Rosen, ‘Mad Men’ & Jaguar: What the Car Company Thinks About 
Its Shocking TV Portrayal, HUFFINGTON POST (May 30, 2012, 11:41 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/30/mad-men-jaguar-response_n_1556053.html. 
266 See id.; see also Lauren Dugan, One Third of the US Population Says “No” to 
Twitter and Facebook, MEDIABISTRO (Sept. 10, 2012, 10:00 AM), http://www.
mediabistro.com/alltwitter/one-third-us-population-not-on-twitter-facebook_b28182. 
267 See Carrie Arnold, Diss Information: Is There a Way to Stop Popular Falsehoods 
from Morphing into “Facts”?, SCI. AM. (Oct. 4, 2012), http://www.
scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=how-to-stop-misinformation-from-becoming-
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268 See id. 
269 Allnutt, supra note 261 (citing Craig Silverman, Visualized: Incorrect Information 
Travels Farther, Faster on Twitter than Corrections, POYNTER (Mar. 7, 2012, 10:55 
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270 See id. 
271 See John Friedman, You Are What You Tweet, REUTERS (June 20, 2011, 1:18 AM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/20/idUS364190237020110620. 
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enough to isolate a trademark’s reputation from how it has been 
portrayed in unsponsored product placement. 
Companies spend tremendous amounts of money building up 
their reputations, often paying more on their marketing 
investments than on the product or service itself.272  They strive to 
give their brands cultural significance by investing in advertising 
and marketing efforts.273  For example, the corporate executive 
owners of major fashion houses spend billions of dollars trying to 
entrance the public.274  They often stage ornate and provocative 
million dollar runway shows.275  Collectively, these owners spend 
billions more on bold advertising campaigns.276  Designers dress 
celebrities for red carpet events to get authentic sounding publicity 
and sponsor events such as Chopard at Cannes and Louis Vuitton 
at the America’s Cup to further align the brand with the essence of 
all things luxury.277  Similarly, colleges looking to protect their 
brands have been seen to deny permission to producers and 
directors that seek to use the school’s clothing in horror movies 
and teen comedies emphasizing sex, drugs, and rock and roll.278  
At least 200 colleges have even hired public-relations firms to 
monitor whenever their schools are mentioned in television, film, 
and the news.279  This allows schools to disassociate themselves 
from any negative, unauthorized associations.280  Each of these 
brands chooses its connections with particularity so that it may 
prevent its marks from being diluted by any negative affiliation. 
The goodwill preserved in a brand’s reputation gives it 
symbolic meaning in product placement.  In fact, the “artistic 
message” for which viewers tune into movies and television 
                                                                                                             
272 See Assaf, supra note 55, at 29. 
273 See id. 
274 See DANA THOMAS, DELUXE: HOW LUXURY LOST ITS LUSTER 9 (Penguin Books 
2007). 
275 See id. 
276 See id. 
277 See id. 
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shows,281 would not be conveyed but for the famous, quickly 
recognized brands lending their identities to the production.282  
Brands have an identity and can implicitly relay stereotypes and 
other notions of cultural significance, thus they are essential tools 
to use when introducing a character to an audience.283  For 
example, the car in which a mom drives her children to school will 
be different than the car a high-powered CEO takes to work.  Both 
cars are a vehicle of truth, relaying information about the character 
and the brand.  Just like people, every trademark has a unique 
personality, and much like the old adage “you are who you hang 
out with,” a mark is also defined by its associations.284  So what 
happens when an incident of unendorsed product placement 
assigns the trademark to a character who poorly reflects upon the 
brand?285  Such associations, especially when consumers believe 
they were paid for, risk blurring the two marks or tarnishing the 
senior mark.286  Accordingly, to prevent such dilution, trademark 
use in product placement should be labeled commercial and only 
permitted once a markholder’s approval has been obtained. 
                                                                                                             
281 See Gulasekaram, supra note 131, at 936. 
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CONCLUSION 
As Landes and Judge Posner argued in their famous article on 
trademark dilution, “people conceal their undesirable 
characteristics in order to create or protect such [reputational] 
capital,” so there should be no opposition to allowing trademarks 
to “flaunt their desirable characteristics.”287  This is especially 
important because a trademark is intended to create a lasting 
impression on consumers.  Trademarks trickle into our 
communicative culture and “fill gaps in our vocabulary and add a 
contemporary flavour to our expressions.”288  Therefore, all marks 
should be allowed to put their best selves forward.  The 
associations made through unsponsored product placement, 
however, end up dictating the self that is portrayed to the public.  
By permitting someone other than a markholder to dictate a 
trademark’s reputation, trademarks are essentially redefined with 
each incident of unsponsored product placement, thereby leaving 
the voids in our vocabulary unfilled. 
While it may seem that the problem of reputational harm can 
be addressed on a case-by-case basis, this solution is inadequate.  
The cost of litigation is high, both monetarily and reputationally.  
Moreover, markholders are often hesitant to litigate positive 
association,289 presumably because it seems pointless to reject free 
advertising and because markholders fear that a judge may render 
their mark invalid.290  And without litigation to put viewers on 
notice of the unauthorized product placement, viewers end up 
presuming that the markholder has endorsed the use.291  Because 
trademarks help to structure language, however, it is evident that 
each unapproved usage, positive or negative, impacts the ultimate 
definition and characterization of the trademark.  The result is 
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necessarily dilution.  For this reason, trademark use in product 
placement should be made a commercial use under the Lanham 
Act and only permitted after the markholder’s approval has been 
obtained. 
 
